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Sale or Disposal: The Extension of CERCLA
Liability to Vendors of Hazardous Materials
I.

INTRODUCTION

Government regulation of hazardous substances increased dramatically with the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA").I CERCLA imposes strict liability2 on all responsible parties for the costs3 incurred from the emergency cleanup of
hazardous substances released into the air, water, or ground.' Section 107 of CERCLA deems the following parties potentially liable
for those cleanup costs: current or past owners and operators of
the affected property, generators who arrange for the disposal or
treatment of hazardous waste, and transporters of the waste.5
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)).
2. Although the statute does not expressly state the standard of liability, courts have
interpreted it to impose strict liability. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that CERCLA defines "liability" with reference to
the same standard that is used in § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988),
which is strict liability).
Additionally, although CERCLA is silent about joint and several liability, courts have
determined that this doctrine is applicable. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that joint and several liability was inherent in
the common law approach discussed by Congress). CERCLA also may be applied retroactively to impose liability for acts committed before its effective date. See, e.g., United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that retroactive application of CERCLA was intended by Congress and
did not constitute an unconstitutional undertaking), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
Contribution actions may be brought against other liable or potentially liable parties
under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"). 42
U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988).
3. CERCLA imposes potential liability up to $50 million. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (c)(1)(C)
(1988).
4. Id. § 9601(8).
5. Id. § 9607(a). Section 107 provides:
Liability
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; "comparable maturity" date. Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,
and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrangedfor disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
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This Comment, however, does not focus on the parties expressly
listed in section 107 of CERCLA. Instead, it focuses on a fourth
class of persons that some courts have found to be potentially liable
under section 107-vendors of hazardous waste.
This Comment first examines the development and legislative
history of CERCLA to determine whether Congress intended the
sale of hazardous substances to trigger liability. 6 It then discusses
two lines of cases that distinguish between manufacturer and vendor liability.7 Finally, this Comment suggests that a clarification of
section 107 of CERCLA is needed and proposes that vendors of
hazardous waste should be liable only under the theory of product
liability.8
II. BACKGROUND

To provide the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("U.S. EPA") with a mechanism to respond quickly to releases of
hazardous substances, Congress enacted CERCLA,9 which authorizes the U.S. EPA to use federal funds to clean up a hazardous
substance release and then locate the parties designated under the
statute as "responsible."' 0 Under CERCLA, generators and transporters of hazardous waste, as well as all past and present owners
and operators of the affected facility, are potentially liable for the
cleanup costs. " However, the legal theories under which Congress
intended to hold these parties liable are unclear because the legislative history of CERCLA is both muddled and gap-filled. Nevertheless, the legislative history does point to the common law
doctrine of strict liability to fill those gaps.' 2
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action ....
Id. (emphasis added).
6. See infra notes 13-55 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 56-170 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 171-214 and accompanying text.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
10. Id. § 9607(a).
11. Id. § 9607; see supra note 5.
12. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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A.

The Development of CERCLA

Before CERCLA was enacted, the issue of hazardous wastes was
addressed when Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA") in 1976.13 RCRA requires the identification and listing of hazardous wastes and regulates the disposal process.1 4 Through RCRA, the U.S. EPA requires generators 5 and
transporters of hazardous waste, 16 and owners and operators of
disposal facilities,' 7 to register and list the wastes they handle and
to keep records of all transactions.'
In addition, RCRA subjects persons who knowingly violate its
requirements to prison terms and fines of up to $50,000 per day of
violation. 19 When the U.S. EPA Administrator determines that
there has been a release of hazardous waste from an authorized
facility, the Act gives the U.S. EPA authority to issue orders for
corrective action, including abatement orders. 20 RCRA expressly
allows general common law defenses, including assumption of the
risk, to criminal charges. 2 '
Despite the seemingly broad enforcement provisions of RCRA,
13. Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992K (1988)).
When considering RCRA, Congress found that prior government regulation, among
other factors, had resulted in an increase in the amount of solid waste. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901(b)(3) (1988). Thus, in RCRA, Congress gave the U.S. EPA broad rulemaking
power. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a) which states in pertinent part:
the Administrator, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and
the States, shall promulgate regulations .... [and s]uch standards shall include
but need not be limited to requirements respecting- (1) recordkeeping ...
[transportation and compliance with the manifest system].
Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). Section 6903(3) provides:
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
Id. This RCRA definition of disposal is often used in CERCLA cases interpreting vendor liability. See, e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y.
1984).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (1988).
16. Id. § 6923(a).
17. Id. § 6924(a).
18. Id. §§ 6922(a), 6923(a), 6924(a).
19. Id. § 6928(d). Persons who knowingly endanger others by placing them in "imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" are subject to higher penalties including
prison terms of not more than 15 years. Id. § 6928(e).
20. Id. § 6928(h).
21. Id. § 6928(0.
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Congress began to recognize the need for supplemental legislation
to address the growing problem of abandoned hazardous waste
dumps. In particular, the "Love Canal" site in Niagara Falls, New
York,22 sparked debate over the need for a statute that would provide an immediate response to such disasters. Thereafter, many
other abandoned waste dumps were discovered, with the discovery
often occurring long after the operator went out of business.
RCRA failed to provide an answer to the problems that these
waste dumps posed because RCRA provided no mechanism to
deal with the particular dilemma of abandoned facilities.
Designed to address abandoned waste dumps, CERCLA has
unique provisions to finance emergency responses to releases from
such facilities. Thus, while RCRA addresses the proper procedures and standards for transport, storage, and disposal of wastes,
CERCLA addresses improper handling or disposal of toxic
products.23
CERCLA liability is triggered by a release or threatened release 24 of a hazardous substance 25 from a facility 26 which results in

22. See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549
(W.D.N.Y. 1988). Hooker Chemical Company (now Occidental Chemical) owned or
operated a hazardous waste disposal operation at the site from 1942 to 1953. Id. at 54849. Hooker then deeded the property to the local Board of Education. Id. at 549. During the period of Hooker's operation, at least 42 million pounds of chemical waste were
deposited on the site. Id. After CERCLA was enacted, the United States and the State
of New York sought to recover the response costs associated with, Love Canal, including
those costs incurred prior to passage of the Act. Id. at 550.
23. See generally WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY §§ 3.20,
3.24 (1987) (explaining RCRA and CERCLA provisions); 1-3 LAW OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE (MB) (Susan M. Cooke ed., 1991) (discussing the requirements of both federal
and state hazardous waste regulations, including RCRA and CERCLA).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). For the definition of "release," see id. § 9601(22).
25. Id. § 9601(14). CERCLA expressly covers the release of hazardous substances.
Hazardous substances are defined by reference to other environmental laws. Thus, hazardous substances include: "any substance designated pursuant to [§ 31 l(b)(2)(A) of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1988)]," 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(A) (1988)
(emphasis added); "any hazardous waste [covered by § 3001 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921
(1988)]," 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C) (1988) (emphasis added); "any hazardous airpollutant
listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, [42 U.S.C. § 7412]," 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(14)(E) (1988) (emphasis added); and "any imminently hazardous chemical substance or
mixture [covered by § 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988)],"
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(F) (1988).
By itself, a defense that the substance released was not a "waste" rarely will be successful. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1252
(D.N.J. 1989) (finding asbestos covered by CERCLA); Ametek Inc. v. Pioneer Salt &
Chem. Co., 709 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that trichloroethylene is a
hazardous substance for CERCLA nurnoses) daho v. Riinker -ill (7n A'AS TR .nn
665, 673 (D. Idaho 1986) (finding "mining wastes" covered); United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (finding previously used caustic
solution covered by CERCLA).
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cleanup costs or injury to natural resources. 27 Once triggered,
CERCLA authorizes the U.S. EPA to compel a cleanup of the
site,2 8 or to begin cleanup on its own.2 9 . The U.S. EPA may remove
the hazardous product or negotiate with the responsible parties for
its removal.30
Section 107 of CERCLA defines potentially responsible parties
as generators, transporters, and both past and present owners and
operators of facilities releasing or threatening the release of hazardous substances. 3 ' CERCLA's express liability provisions focus on
the potentially responsible party's ("PRP") degree of control over
the disposal decision, as well as the degree of control involved in
the selection of the site for the purpose of disposal. In this fashion,
CERCLA serves the stated goal of RCRA-"requiring that the
hazardous waste be properly managed in the first instance thereby
32
reducing the need for corrective action at a future date."
Although CERCLA does not expressly name vendors as poten26. Under CERCLA, "facility" can mean a building, pipeline, landfill, or any other
site where hazardous substances may have been deposited. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
See, e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (drag
strip on which hazardous substance was sprayed was a "facility" for purposes of

CERCLA).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988) (listing the various forms of response costs). The
U.S. EPA assumes jurisdiction over the facility and then may require the Justice Department to secure injunctive relief to abate a release or threatened release. Id. § 9606(a).
28. Id. § 9606(a). Failure to comply with orders is punishable by fines of up to
$25,000 per day. Id. § 9606(b).
29. Id. § 9604(a).
30. Id. § 9622(a). A party who chooses to settle with the U.S. EPA avoids the costs
of litigation, escapes joint and several liability and, in some instances, receives a release
from future liability. Id. § 9622(c)(1). In addition, parties who settle with the U.S. EPA
still may seek contribution from non-settling parties. Id. § 9613(f)(1). Therefore, when
more than one party is potentially responsible, the wisest course of action is to settle first
and then sue for contribution. See Anne D. Weber, Misery Loves Company: Spreading
the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1483-92 (1989) (discussing settlement with the government and contribution actions against other potentially responsible parties).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Persons covered by section 107 are liable for all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government, the necessary
costs of response incurred by another person, damages to natural resources, and health
assessment costs. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
With respect to defenses, CERCLA liability is subject only to the defenses listed in the
Act itself. Defenses available to persons otherwise liable under § 107(a) are expressly
limited to the following: "(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of
a third party" who is neither an agent of the person nor acting in regard to a contractual
arrangement. Id. § 9607(b). The defenses must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
Finally, the maximum liability under CERCLA is $50 million, except in cases of wilful
misconduct or gross negligence. Id. § 9607(c)(1)(C), (c)(2).
32. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5) (1988).
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tially liable parties under section 107, it did name vendors in its
provisions regarding the Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund ("Trust Fund"). 33 Congress set up the Trust Fund to pay for
immediate cleanup of hazardous substance releases. 34 Taxes on the
sale of certain hazardous materials provide most of the financing
for the Trust Fund.35 The Trust Fund responds to releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances by providing access to
trust monies under sections 104 and 106 of CERCLA.36
Despite the fact that the imposition of taxes on the sale of specified chemicals is the only express coverage under CERCLA for
vendors,3 7 courts nevertheless have held vendors liable under section 107. Before this Comment outlines the opinions handed down
by those courts, it will discuss the legislative history of CERCLA
with respect to Congress's intent regarding CERCLA liability.
B.

Legislative History of CERCLA

Determining congressional intent in CERCLA cases is a chronic
problem, especially when attempting to determine the Act's applicability to vendors. Courts have described CERCLA as having a
"well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history, ' 38 and as being
"unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements. 3 9
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(c)(1), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-409, 100 Stat. 1774 (1986).
Aside from this provision, no other place in the record or in the Act itself considers
liability for vendors of hazardous substances.
34. Id. The fund originally was designed to reach $1.6 billion, with industry supplying 87.5% of the revenues. Id. § 9631, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1774
(1986). SARA increased the fund to $8.5 billion. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).
35. 26 U.S.C. § 4661 (1988). The specific hazardous chemicals and corresponding
taxes are enumerated in § 4661(b) of the Trust Fund. Id. § 4661(b). Authorization for
the appropriation of these taxes to the Trust Fund is granted under § 9507(b). Id.
§ 9507(b). This fund is supplemented by government funds. Id. § 9507.
36. A party compelled by the U.S. EPA to take remedial action may seek reimbursement from the Trust Fund, provided it is not a party otherwise liable. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(C) (1988). However, the Trust Fund does not act as a government waste disposal insurance policy and liable parties are held responsible for their own
cleanup and response costs. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d
1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that ultimate financial responsibility rests "on those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons" (quoting Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1981))); see
also 1 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRA/CERCLA CASE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 7 (1985) ("Cost recovery for response activities seeking reimbursement and Superfund expenditures will be initiated in every appropriate case where there
are viable potentially responsible parties.").
37. see supra note J3.
38. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985).
39. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Three major
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The Committee Report to the original Senate bill offers assistance in determining the scope of liability.' In particular, the report notes that liability is imposed on generators of hazardous
waste because "they have more knowledge about the risk inherent
in their wastes... and they determine whether and how to dispose
of these 4 wastes-on
their own sites or at locations controlled by
1
others."

C.

CERCLA and Common Law Strict Liability

Various statements in the legislative history of CERCLA indicate that common law rules of strict liability were meant to apply
when the statute remained silent.4 2 The Senate Committee stated
that "the most analogous areas of the law are product liability and
liability for abnormally dangerous activities.

' 43

Although specific

references to strict liability were deleted before Congress passed
CERCLA, courts, in keeping with their view of Congress's intent," generally apply a standard of strict liability in deciding
bills dealing with hazardous waste were considered in the 96th Congress: H.R. 7020,
introduced Apr. 2, 1980; H.R. 85, introduced Jan. 15, 1979; and S.1480, introduced July
11, 1979. Additionally, S.1341, introduced June 14, 1979, was discussed during Senate
hearings but died before reaching the full committee. In the end, none of these bills
passed. See ENVIRONMENTAL L. INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at xvxvii (Helen Cohn Needham et al., eds., 2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

CERCLA as finally enacted was a quickly drawn compromise to S. 1480, containing
reductions in the size of Superfund, limits on compensation for each occurrence of natural resource damage, and the elimination of medical expenses to victims of releases. Id. at
xx. As one legislator commented, "[F]rankly, it eliminates 75 percent of what we were
seeking in S.1480. But knowing of the urgent need for legislation, we were willing to do
that." 126 CONG. REC. 30,935 (1980) (statement of Sen. Stafford of Vermont).
40. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33 (1980). The Report of the Committee
on Environmentaland Public Works, EnvironmentalEmergency Response Act [hereinafter
S.1480 Committee Report] accompanied S.1480 and explains the historical background
of liability and the strict liability provisions of S.1480.
41. S.1480 Committee Report, supra note 40, at 15.
42. 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph of West Virginia)
(explaining that although specific references to joint and several liability were deleted
from both S. 1480 and H.R. 7020 before passage, such liability was assumed to carry
through via common law interpretation); 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of
Rep. Florio of New Jersey) (affirming the preservation of liability through traditional
common law principles).
43. S.1480 Committee Report, supra note 40, at 14.
44.

126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph of West Virginia,

presenting the substitute bill) ("We have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act."); see City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding
that the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988), incorporates a standard of strict
liability).
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CERCLA cases.45 Courts may apply strict liability under
CERCLA by characterizing the storage, transport, and disposal
of
46
hazardous substances as "abnormally dangerous [activities]."
Common law strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
derives from two sources. The first is the line of cases stemming
from the English case Rylands v. Fletcher.47 The second source of
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities is found in section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.48
Under CERCLA, courts impose strict liability on owners and
operators who acted without fault,4 9 on foreclosing mortgage holders, 50 and on parent and successor corporations.' Strict liability,
45. See supra note 2.
46. S.1480 Committee Report, supra note 40, at 33 ("S. 1480 declares the manufacture, use, transportation and disposal of hazardous substances to be abnormally dangerous activities ... and, therefore, subject to a rule of strict liability.").
47. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). In Rylands, the court developed the general principle
that "the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there ... anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril ... and is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
Id.; see Jon G. Anderson, Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous,or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 99, 10304 (listing U.S. jurisdictions that have applied the Rylands principle of strict liability); see
also S. 1480 Committee Report, supra note 40, at 33 (citing the Rylands strict liability
rule).
48. Section 519 states the general principles as follows:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). The Restatement also lists six factors
a court should consider in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is out-weighed by its dangerous attributes.
Id. § 520.
49. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that
§ 107 holds the current owner strictly liable without causation requirement).
50. United States v. Fleet Factors. 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding that
a secured creditor may be liable "if its involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal
decisions"); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa.
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however, is not absolute liability, and therefore it permits certain
defenses. Under the Rylands doctrine, courts recognize several defenses, including contributory fault and acts of God. 2 The Restatement also lists several defenses, including a plaintiff's
abnormally sensitive activity,53 performance of a public duty, 54 and
assumption of the risk. 5"
Thus, the intent of Congress to have common law principles and
defenses fill the gaps left by CERCLA seems clear. However,
courts interpreting the congressional intent have not been able to
concur as to what parts of CERCLA are unclear, and therefore
need of congressional clarification.

III. DISCUSSION
Courts across the country have taken varying approaches to the
issue of the liability of vendors of hazardous substances under
CERCLA. Courts that have held vendors liable under CERCLA
have found vendors to fall within the definition of generators or
owners under section 107.56 In contrast, courts that have refused
to hold vendors liable have reasoned that vendors do not play an
active part in the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes because their transactions are not made for the purpose of disposal or
treatment. 57
A.

Cases Finding Vendors Potentially Liable

In 1984, the court in United States v. A & F MaterialsCo.5 denied summary judgment to a defendant who generated caustic material, holding that generators of waste are responsible for the
ultimate disposal of their waste. The defendant, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, solicited bids on approximately 500,000 gallons of
Oct. 1, 1985) (holding that secured creditors may be liable under CERCLA when they
exercise control over the property).
51. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988)
(finding that Congress intended to hold liable those successor corporations that have
"merged with or have consolidated" under CERCLA).
52. See, e.g., Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 537 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Wyo.
1975) (listing the defenses available under Rylands: " 'The defendant can excuse himself
by showing that the [damage] was owing to the plaintiff's default or perhaps that the
[damage] was the consequence of vis major or the act of God.'" (citations omitted)).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (1977).
54. Id. § 521.
55. Id. § 523.
56. See infra notes 58-112 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 113-70 and accompanying text.
58. 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
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a spent caustic solution generated as a result of manufacturing
processes.5 9 A & F Materials Company, a processor of industrial
waste, was the highest bidder and ultimately received seventeen
shipments of the solution at its waste oil reclamation plant.6 After
a release at the A & F Materials site, the United States sued McDonnell Douglas for "arranging for disposal" of hazardous wastes
under section 107.61
The District Court for the Southern District of Illinois confronted the issue of whether McDonnell Douglas's sale of the spent
62
caustic material could be construed as "arranging for disposal.
The court first noted what it characterized as CERCLA's "broad
language" 63 and found that McDonnell Douglas "otherwise arranged for disposal" of the caustic solution at the A & F Materials
facility, thereby exposing McDonnell Douglas to CERCLA liability.64 . The court stated that the most important factor for determining liability was McDonnell Douglas's role in the choice of the
disposition site. 65 Thus, the court found it irrelevant that the disposition was made by sale and that the decision to place the material at this site was incidental to selecting the highest bidder.'
Another CERCLA case, New York v. General Electric Co. ,67 involved the sale and disposal of a "hazardous product contained
within another product. '6 In the early 1960s, General Electric
Company ("GE") sold used electric transformer oil to a dragstrip
operator for use as a dust suppressant. 69 After soil and air sample
analyses revealed contamination, the State of New York sued and
alleged that GE sold the oil knowing it contained PCBs.70 GE
59. Id. at 844-45.
60. Id. at 844.
61, Id. at 844-45.
62. Id. at 845.
63. Id. "The Court is impressed with the broad language in § 9607(a)(3) which imposes liability on 'any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrangedfor disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances . . . at any facility . . . containing such

hazardous substances.'" Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. McDonnell Douglas "decided to place its hazardous waste into the hands of
A & F Materials to be used and disposed of at [the site]." Id. Without citing any specific
CERCLA provision, the court stated that "it is precisely this decision that CERCLA was
intended to regulate." Id.
66. Id.
67. 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
68. Id. at 293. Between 400 and 500 55-gallon drums of used transformer oil were
after
use
, uiiciLukuWlS
A -_. ... ^ ,,
found to have containd nnh1,',n+
use.o
aie
n ui
nn
-.
I.....
_\ .
-1
on the purchaser's dragstrip. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 294 n.6. This opinion was a ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss under
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moved to dismiss, arguing that the dragstrip did not qualify as a
facility under CERCLA and denying that its act constituted disposal.?' GE stated that it only sold oil to the dragstrip for use as the

72
dragstrip owner saw fit.

The court denied GE's motion to dismiss.73 It held that the
dragstrip qualified as a "facility" even though the express language
of the statute was not satisfied. 74 Addressing the disposal issue, the
court structured its holding around two views of legal intent: congressional intent in passing CERCLA and the intent issue addressed by the court in A & F Materials. 7 The General Electric
court first looked to the Act's legislative history and found that
Congress meant to prevent PRPs from "contracting away" their
responsibility by alleging that the incident was caused by the act or
omission of a third party.76 The court then cited A & F Materials,
stating that a waste generator's 77 liability is not to be "facilely circumvented by its characterization of its arrangements as 'sales.' ",78
Consequently, the court held that the sale in question was a disposal arrangement subjecting GE to CERCLA liability.79
The court in United States v. Conservation Chemical Co. 80 took
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and all factual allegations in the complaint were therefore as-

sumed to be true. Id. at 293 n.3.
71. Id. at 294-97.
72. Id. at 297.
73. Id. at 304.
74. Id. at 296-97. Section 107 provides for liability of any person who "arranged for
disposal or treatment .... at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). GE, therefore, argued that the dragstrip
was not a facility under CERCLA because it contained no hazardous substances prior to
the sale. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 295. Although the court found GE's argument
"not lacking entirely in intuitive appeal," it also found the "hypertechnical construction
to be unsupported by the legislative history and contradicted by simple common sense."
Id. at 296.
75. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
76. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 297.
77. Like McDonnell Douglas in A& F Materials,GE generated the waste that it sold.
See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
78. GeneralElec., 592 F. Supp. at 297. Unfortunately, the court did not discuss this
issue further. As a result, the General Electric and A & F Materials decisions are certainly distinguishable. In A & F Materials, the buyer-disposer purchased the product for
the very properties that made it hazardous, i.e., that its caustic nature made it suitable for
use in neutralizing acidic oils. A & F Materials, 582 F. Supp. at 844. By contrast, in
General Electric, the PCB contamination and its hazardous nature were hidden from the
buyer. GeneralElec., 592 F. Supp. at 297. As discussed below, this distinction is important in establishing the common law defense of assumption of the risk. See infra notes
195-212 and accompanying text.
79. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 297.
80. 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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the A & F Materials reasoning a step further. As in A & F Materials, this action resulted from the sale of chemical wastes including
alkaline products to an oil reclamation company.81 Kansas City
Power & Light Company sold fly ash 2 to the principal defendant,
Conservation Chemical Company, and was brought in as a thirdparty defendant following a release.83
Holding that the sale of fly ash was covered under section 107 as
an act of disposal, the court stated that the definition of disposal is
not limited to transactions in which the site owner is paid to dispose of the hazardous substances.84 The court read section 107
broadly and followed A & F Materialsin looking to the "party who
both owned the hazardous waste and made the crucial decision
how it would be disposed of or treated."8 " The court also took the
next logical step in the A & F Materialsreasoning, stating that intent to dispose is not a requirement for a finding of liability under
CERCLA's strict liability standard. 86 The court therefore held
Kansas City Power & Light potentially liable and denied its motion for summary judgment.8 7
United States v. Aceto AgriculturalChemicals Corp.8 presented a
different type of disposal liability problem. In Aceto, the U.S. EPA
sued eight pesticide manufacturers under section 107 for reimbursement of over $10 million in response costs incurred as a result
of the cleanup of a pesticide formulation facility.8 9 The pesticide
manufacturers sent raw pesticide to the facility for formulation
into finished products. 90 Through fire, mishandling by the formulator, and leaking storage, both raw and formulated pesticide were
81. Id. at 182-83.
82. Id. at 237-38. Fly ash, also known as lime slurry, is a by-product of the combustion of coal. Id. at 238. The product was purchased to neutralize other wastes processed
at the facility. Id at 239.
83. Id. at 237-39.
84. Id. at 240-41. Citing A & F Materials and General Electric, the court stated that
"[t]he direction of flow of monetary consideration is not the test of liability under
CERCLA." Id at 240.
85. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845
(S.D. Ill. 1984)).
86. Id. Attempting to distinguish GeneralElectric and A & F Materials, the defendants argued that those courts focused on whether the defendant had acted "with the
intent to dispose." Id. The Conservation Chemical court found the argument "misguided" and concluded that "CERCLA required neither intent nor even negligence, but
provides for strict liability." Id
87. Id.
?,8.;72 F.2d. i373 (;ih Cir. i989)).
89. Id. at 1375.
90. Id. Aidex Corporation had operated the facility for seven years before going
bankrupt in 1981. Id.
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released onto the site. 9' The U.S. EPA claimed that because waste
generation was an inherent part of the pesticide formulation, the
defendant pesticide manufacturers "arranged for disposal" of the
pesticide waste when they contracted with Aidex Corporation, the
facility operator, and therefore
were liable. 92 The pesticide manu93
facturers moved to dismiss.
Citing the language of section 107-"or otherwise arranged for
the disposal"-the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that this
language requires a liberal interpretation. 94 Since it found that the
U.S. EPA had stated a cause of action, the court denied the motion
to dismiss." The court stated that the defendants could be liable
96
under both section 107 and common law theories of agency.
Although Aceto did not involve the sale of legally hazardous substances, the decision is significant due to its holding of responsibility for accidental disposal without a showing of control of the
facility.
In the case of United States v. Farber,97 the court reasoned that
vendors can be liable for the sale of hazardous substances if those
substances are found to be "wastes." In Farber,Rambach Chemical, a vendor of chemical raw materials, was included in a
CERCLA action after a release at its customer's manufacturing
facility.9 Rambach moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the "sale of a product is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish
liability under CERCLA." 99 Moreover, Rambach argued that because the terms "treatment" and "disposal" relate to action taken
with regard to hazardous "waste," its action as a supplier of chemical substances that were clearly not "wastes" precluded attaching
liability under section 107.11
The trial court agreed with Rambach's assertion that the mere
91. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1385 (S.D.
Iowa 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
92. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378.
93. Id. at 1376.
94. Id. at 1380.
95. Id. at 1384.
96. Id. at 1382 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 413, 416, 427, 427A
(1965)). Other cases have held sellers of hazardous products potentially liable under different CERCLA § 9607 subsections. See, e.g., Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt & Chem. Co.,
709 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that a chemical vendor may incur liability
as an operator under § 9607(a)(2) for allegedly spilling chemicals during an on-site
delivery).
97. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,854 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 1988).
98. Id. at 20,855.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 20,855-56.
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sale of a hazardous substance should not and does not expose a
party to CERCLA liability.'0 1 However, the court concluded that
CERCLA contemplated attaching liability to one who "arranges
for the treatment or disposal" of hazardous substances, whether or
not the substances could be characterized as a "waste."' 0 2 Because
the court found that the facts alleged could change the character of
the transaction from one of a sale to one of a disposal,
the court
0 3
denied Rambach's motion for summary judgment.
Although the court's language appears to shield suppliers from
liability, the relevant factual allegation was only that Rambach's
chemicals could require processing by the customer prior to use.'°4
The court held that the allegations of required treatment of the
products were material to a possible finding of disposal liability.'0 5
In summary, under the A & F Materials line of cases, which
includes Conservation Chemical and Aceto, section 107 is given one
of the broadest readings possible, often triggering liability. 106 The
courts in these cases read the term "disposal" to include the sale of
a useful substance and stated that no intent to dispose is required.0 7 In these cases, the major question in imposing liability is
in determining which party decided to place the material "into the
hands of a facility that contains hazardous wastes."'' 0 However,
as the General Electric 109 court noted, a finding that the facility
previously contained hazardous waste is not always necessary for a
finding of liability. 0 Courts may hold generators liable although
they had no knowledge of the site where their waste was
2 demonstrates that some
dumped.'
The decision in Farber"I
courts continue to apply this broad construction of the term
"disposal."
101. Id. at 20,856.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 20,857. Rambach had been characterized by the third party, Farber, as a
"scavenger of chemical materials, including off-grade and odd-lot materials [that] required treatment before being utilized as a product or product ingredient." Id. at 20,856.
104. Id. at 20,856-57.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 58-96 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 241 (W.D.
Mo. 1985).
108. Id. at 240.
109. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
110. Id. at 296-97.
111. See United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304-05 n.3 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
.
. .....
.
.
ptiy disposes of waste precludes use of
innocent-third-party defense).
112. United States v. Farber, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,854 (D.N.J. Mar.
16, 1988); see supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
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B.

Cases Finding Vendors Not Potentially Liable

Before General Electric, A & F Materials, Conservation Chemical, and Aceto were decided, the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana addressed the issue of vendor liability in United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." 3 Westinghouse Corporation, the principal defendant, used PCBs supplied by Monsanto
Chemical Company and then disposed of them in a landfill.1 4 The
U.S. EPA sued to recover response costs following a release of the
PCBs." 5 Westinghouse brought a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification against Monsanto, 1 6 claiming that,
under CERCLA, it had a private right of action against Monsanto
as supplier of the PCBs." 7
The Westinghouse court stated that CERCLA liability is limited
to those parties directly involved in an affirmative act of waste
product disposal."Is The court found that the government's claims
were based on Westinghouse's improper disposal of the product,
not on Monsanto's prior sale to Westinghouse.' ' 9 Because Monsanto did not generate or dispose of any hazardous waste and did
not contract for disposal of waste, the court dismissed Westinghouse's claim against Monsanto. 20 Thus, the Westinghouse court
held that a party must be active in waste generation and disposal to
12
incur third-party liability under CERCLA.'
In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 122 the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois read section
107's liability provision even more narrowly than the Westinghouse
court. In Hines Lumber, the plaintiff incurred costs in the cleanup
of its wood-treating facility and sought contribution from the suppliers of chemicals used in its wood-treating process. 23 After the
court dismissed Hines Lumber Company's state law claims against
113. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,483 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 1983).
114. Id. at 20,484.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (stating that the objectives of CERCLA include "the prohibiting of open
dumping of hazardous wastes ... [and] the converting of existing open dumps to nonhazardous dumps").
119. Id.
120. Id. at 20,484-85.
121. Id. at 20,484. The court's treatment of the issue of contribution may prove to be
unique because no right to contribution had been codified at the time of this decision.
The right to contribution is now codified in § 113 of SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1)
(1988).
122. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
123. Id. at 652-53.
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most of the suppliers, 2 4 the remaining defendants, suppliers of creosote and chromated copper arsenate, moved for summary
25
judgment.
Relying on cases that interpreted sales transactions as acts of
disposal under section 107, Hines Lumber argued that the chemical suppliers were subject to CERCLA liability. 126 However, the
court rejected Hines Lumber's argument that section 107 reaches
chemical manufacturers who sell hazardous substances to parties
who use and then dispose of the products on the same site. 27 The
court agreed that CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substances"
included primary products and by-products as well as waste products, but the court stated that CERCLA liability extended only to
those transactions made for the purpose of disposal or treatment of
such substances. 128 The court interpreted Hines Lumber's argument as an attempt to remove an express
statutory limitation on
29
liability contrary to legislative intent.
Hines Lumber appealed, but argued only that Osmose Wood
Preserving Company, one of its suppliers, would fall within the
section 101 definition of "owner or operator."'' 30 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the statute provided
no guidance,' and thus applied common law principles. 32 The
124. Id. at 653 (citing prior dismissals of counts against Vulcan Materials, Monsanto,
and other suppliers).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 654-55 (noting Hines Lumber's reliance on New York v. General Elec.
Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), and United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.,
619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985)); see supra notes 67-87 and accompanying text (discussing General Electric and Conservation Chemical). The Hines Lumber court disagreed
with the reasoning in Conservation Chemical to the extent that the holding in that earlier
case allowed liability to attach to any transaction involving a hazardous substance regardless of the motivation behind the transaction. Hines Lumber, 685 F. Supp. at 655-56
(suggesting that Conservation Chemical, at most, stands for the proposition that a court
should not grant defendant's summary judgment when there exists evidence of a motivation to dispose of a waste or by-product).
127. Hines Lumber, 685 F. Supp. at 654.
128. Id. The Hines Lumber court held that the sale of wood-treating chemicals as a
primary product, without intent to dispose, does not qualify as disposal. Id. at 656. The
court also stated that the vendors were not liable even if they knew how the process waste
would be disposed. Id. Thus, the court refused to impose liability on the vendor. Id.
129. Id. at 656 n.5.
130. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.
1988). Hines Lumber previously argued that Osmose incurred liability under CERCLA
essentially as a "disposer" by "arrang[ing] for disposal or treatment" of hazardous substances. Hines Lumber. 6R5 F %mp, t fA
131. Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at 157 (criticizing CERCLA's sole applicability to operators and owners and not to other parties, such as architects or engineers).
132. Id. at 157-58.
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court reasoned that because Osmose, as a supplier, did not have
enough "day-to-day control" to be liable under common law, it
could not be considered an operator for purposes of section 107.133
The Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] court's job is to find and enforce stopping points no less than to implement other legislative
34
choices."1

In PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. United States Gypsum

Co. ,'13the plaintiffs 136 sought to recover damages under CERCLA

from vendors of asbestos-infected materials that were used in
buildings in which the vendors had an ownership interest. 137 The
plaintiffs alleged that by virtue of transporting and distributing
these materials, the defendant, United States Gypsum Company
("USG"), arranged for and was responsible for the disposal of
these substances.' 38 USG moved to dismiss these counts arguing
that its sale did not constitute "disposal" under section 107 of
39
CERCLA.1

The court first observed that Congress, by enacting CERCLA,
sought to provide a cleanup mechanism for abandoned hazardous
waste dumps and hazardous substance releases.1I° The court then
reviewed the CERCLA and RCRA definitions of "disposal"141 and
held that liability would arise under section 107 only if USG had
taken an affirmative step toward disposing of a hazardous substance.142 Specifically, the court said that for USG to be liable, it
must have "dumped [its] waste on the site at issue."' 143 Finding
that the question of liability turned on whether "the transfer of a
hazardous substance . . . [was a sale] . . .rather than a disposal

arrangement,"'"

the court held that "the sale of a hazardous sub-

stance for a purpose other than its disposal does not expose ... [a

party] to CERCLA liability."' 145 Since the sale of asbestos in this
133. Id.
134. Id. at 157.
135. 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1989).
136. The plaintiffs were Prudential Insurance Company of America, PIC Realty Corporation, and 745 Property Investments. Id.at 1246.
137. Id.at 1248.
138. Id.at 1249.
139. Id.at 1249-50.
140. Id.at 1251.
141. Id. at 1253; see supra note 14 (setting forth the definition of "disposal" under
RCRA).
142. Prudential,711 F. Supp. at 1254.
143. Id. at 1253 (citing Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F.
Supp. 1257, 1260 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1411 (3d Cir. 1988)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1254.
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case was for a useful purpose, the court held that the sale did not
constitute a "disposal" under CERCLA.' 46
The Prudentialand Hines Lumber decisions were followed by
the District Court for the Western District of Michigan in Kelley v.
Arco Industries Corp.14 7 In Kelley, the State of Michigan brought a
suit under CERCLA against Arco Industries Corporation, a manufacturer of rubber goods, for damage to ground water caused by
the company's disposal of rubber-related compounds.1 4 After settling with the State, Arco Industries filed a third-party complaint
against E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Corporation ("Du Pont") and
several other suppliers of the released chemicals. 49 Arco Industries alleged that Du Pont knew of the manner in which Arco used
and disposed of chemicals.' 50 Arco Industries also alleged that Du
Pont knew that its product contained toluene, a hazardous substance of no use to Arco that could have been removed prior to the
sale. 15 1
The trial judge rejected Arco Industries's contention that the
sale of a product containing an unnecessary hazardous substance
subjected Du Pont to CERCLA liability. 152 Adhering to the rationale of Hines Lumber, the court found legislative intent against
holding vendors liable and noted that earlier cases had rejected a
15 3
broad reading of the "otherwise arranged for disposal" language.
The court held that Du Pont was not liable because it lacked an
54
affirmative intent to dispose of the product.
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,' the
court revealed the need for clarification on the issue of vendor liability. Florida Power & Light involved the disposal of an electric
transformer containing PCBs. 56 Florida Power & Light Company
was held liable for the damage caused by the release of these PCBs
and sued Allis-Chalmers Corporation, the manufacturer of the
transformers, for contribution.' 5 7 The utility alleged that Allis146. Id. at 1254-55.
147. 739 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
148. Id. at 356.
149. Id. at 355-56.
150. Id. at 356.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 359-60.
153. Id. at 360. The trial court judge stated, "I cannot, however, substitute my own
policy preferences for those quite evidently held by Congress when it enacted
§ 107(a)(3)." Id.
154. Id. at 360-61
155. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
156. Id. at 1315.
157. Id.

1992]

Sale or Disposal

Chalmers was ultimately responsible for the disposal of the PCBs
because it was the entity that originally sold the transformers.' 58
After the trial court granted summary judgment for Allis-Chal' Florida Power & Light appealed.16°
mers, 159
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not overturn the
lower court decision because it found no abuse of discretion by the
trial court.' 6 ' The court, however, significantly weakened the language in the lower court opinion regarding supplier liability. First,
the court rejected the idea of a per se rule holding vendors liable
under the "otherwise arranged for disposal" standard. 62 Second,
the court stated that even though a manufacturer does not decide
how, when, or by whom a hazardous substance is to be disposed,
that manufacturer may still be liable.' 63 The court explained that
in order for a manufacturer to be liable it must be "the party [that
'
was] responsible for 'otherwise arranging' for the disposal.
Unfortunately, the court did not define the term "otherwise arranging for the disposal." Thus, this appellate review was a Pyrrhic victory for vendors because the court rejected a per se rule of
liability for manufacturers and left the issue of liability to be re65
solved on a case-by-case basis.
167
in summary, the decisions in Hines Lumber," Prudential,
and Kelley '68 interpret section 107 of CERCLA to require an affirmative act of disposal before holding parties liable under the
"otherwise arranging for disposal" language. 6 9 These courts use a
more conventional definition of disposal: it must be shown that the
70
party in some way "dumped [its] waste on the site at issue.'
Thus, courts that have refused to hold suppliers of hazardous
wastes liable as generators, transporters, or owners under
CERCLA liability provisions stress both the amount of contact the
158. Id.
159. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,998 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 1988).
160. Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1315.
161. Id. at 1318-19.
162. Id. at 1318.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
167. Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 711 F. Supp. 1244
(D.N.J. 1989).
168. Kelley v. Arco Industries Corp., 739 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
169. Id. at 359; Prudential,711 F. Supp. at 1253; Hines Lumber, 685 F. Supp. at 656.
170. Prudential,711 F. Supp. at 1253 (citations omitted).
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suppliers had with the chemical and the purpose of the sale. The
judicial split in the interpretation of section 107 demonstrates that
clarification is needed with respect to this provision.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The issue of vendor liability continues to loom as an unknown
for vendors of hazardous materials. There are several compelling
reasons for Congress to clarify the scope of section 107 of
CERCLA. First, as the discussion above illustrates, there is a conflict between at least two Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the
interpretation of the "otherwise arranged for disposal" language in
section 107.
The split in the courts on this issue has resulted in strikingly
different results for similarly situated parties. In Hines Lumber,
the chemical supplier escaped liability even though it was actively
involved in both the design of the storage plant and the handling of
the wood-treatment chemicals.1 7 1 Similarly, in Kelley, the suppliers avoided liability despite the allegation that the products they
sold contained hazardous substances that were not needed and
could be construed as waste inherent in the product.1 72 In contrast, the courts in Farber17 3 and Aceto 174 considered the disposal
of hazardous substances contained within useful products as an inherent part of the sale or transfer, thereby equating sale with disposal.175 The judicial split reinforces the attack launched by one
congressman who stated: "[CERCLA as finally written] is
unexcusably
vague in terms of identifying who should be liable and
' 176
for what."

The second reason for Congress to clarify the issue of vendor
liability under CERCLA involves the strong policy considerations
against the imposition of disposal liability on the sale of hazardous
products. The imposition of disposal liability would place a potentially enormous burden on an important segment of the economy-the suppliers of useful products. Moreover, this risk may
not be insurable under standard general comprehensive liability
171. Hines Lumber, 685 F. Supp. at 656. The court emphasized that the supplier
never operated the facility or exercised any control over the disposal process. Id.
172. Kelley, 739 F. Supp. at 360-61.
173. United States v. Farber, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,854 (D.N.J. Mar.
16, 1988).
174. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
175. Farber, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,856; Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384.
176. 126 CONG. REc. 31,969 (1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill of North Carolina).
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policies.' 77 Liability is imposed even though the vendor, aside
from accepting an order, has no control over the ultimate disposition of the product.
A third reason for congressional clarification of section 107 liability is that the statute as a whole suggests that vendors should not
be subject to liability, or at least that vendors should be able to rely
on the common law defenses for strict liability. Nevertheless,
courts have found holes in the statute and have held vendors liable.
Although courts have held that there is no causation requirement under section 107,178 it is apparent that parties are found liable under this provision because they had the ability to control or
influence the disposition of hazardous substances. 79 Owners, operators, generators consciously disposing, and transporters choosing the site of disposal possess some degree of control over the
methods of waste disposition. Even past owners who owned the
facility at the time that hazardous substances were actually released are held liable by virtue of their ability to control procedures
during the critical period of disposal.18 0 In this fashion, section
107 achieves the objectives of the Congress that enacted it: "to
make those who release hazardous substances strictly liable for
cleanup costs.''8
This degree of control over the disposition of hazardous substances is absent in a sales transaction. Once title to the material
transfers, the vendor generally has no ability to ensure that the
hazardous substances are handled properly. Sole control of the
product shifts to the buyer who decides where, how, or whether to
dispose of the substance. It is unlikely that without expressly stating so, Congress meant for vendors who are without control over
the disposal decision to be liable. Yet, some courts have held that
177. Some courts have held that CERCLA damages are not covered by standard
insurance policies. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co. 842 F.2d 977, 986-87 (8th Cir.) (policy strictly construed to exclude CERCLA dam-

ages), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d
1348, 1352-54 (4th Cir. 1987) (policy covers only legal damages, not CERCLA damages
which are equitable in nature), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1008 (1988). But see Avondale
Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir. 1989) (remedial damages
covered since not expressly disclaimed). See generally Debi L. Davis, Comment, Insureds
Versus Insurers: Litigating Comprehensive General Liability Policy Coverage in the
CERCLA Arena-A Losing Battle for Both Sides, 43 Sw. L.J. 969 (1990).
178. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
179. See supra text accompanying note 41.
180. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 993 (D.S.C. 1986).
181. 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph of West Virginia).
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Congress did intend this result. 18 2
Absent congressional guidance or clarification, a vendor has few
options. First, to protect itself against future losses, a vendor may
execute an indemnification agreement with its customer. 18 3 To
have practical effect, however, the customer must be able to withstand a potential CERCLA judgment of up to $50 million. 84 Second, a vendor may refuse to sell used materials since a sale of
products that can be characterized as waste is more likely to be
held an act of disposal. 85 Finally, the vendor may withdraw from
the hazardous materials business altogether.
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has described strict
liability as a legal discouragement of the activities subject to the
liability.1 8 6 Strict liability for the acts of those not within one's
control is even more likely to discourage the activity. Because
trade in hazardous substances serves a useful and necessary purpose, continued imposition of vendor liability under CERCLA will
curtail a socially valuable function.
After Conservation Chemical,8 7 a prudent generator may retain,
treat, store, and dispose of substances even though they are wellsuited for use by the company next door. This second company
will then be forced into the virgin product market and additional
hazardous material will be produced, transported, stored, and
eventually disposed.
Aside from being wasteful, this strong disincentive to reuse runs
contrary to stated environmental policy. As noted previously,
RCRA 8 a set policies and procedures for the disposition of solid
waste and stated: "Congress finds ... that millions of tons of recoverable material which could be used are needlessly buried each
182. Compare United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845
(S.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that "[i]t is precisely this [sales] decision that CERCLA was
intended to regulate") with Kelley v. Arco Industries Corp., 739 F. Supp. 354, 360 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (holding that Congress clearly intended to exclude vendors from CERCLA
liability).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988).
184. Id. § 9607(c)(1)(d).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Farber, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,854
(D.N.J. Mar. 16, 1988) (potentially incorrectly-made product); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (caustic ash by-product); United
States v. A & F Materials, Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (spent caustic solution).
186. RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW-CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 477
(1982) ("A rule of strict liability automatically induces potential injurers to consider activity changes as a method. altp-rntjv_
g.r-t z--,, 61 , -Guuing expecteo accident
costs.").
187. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1988).

19921

Sale or Disposal

year.""s9 RCRA sets as a goal the recovery and reuse of materials
that otherwise would increase the volume of solid waste. 190 Congress intended CERCLA to supplement the overall federal waste
management policy.' 91 When, as in the case of vendor liability,
CERCLA's effect is to reduce or eliminate the reuse of materials, it
thwarts the efficient use of resources and increases the volume of
solid waste.
The motivation behind the U.S. EPA's pursuit of the broadest
possible group of responsible parties is understandable, given the
enormity of the abandoned waste dump problem and the limited
monies available. 92 As the manager of a fund with limited resources, the U.S. EPA will try whenever possible to compel private
party cleanup. 193 Therefore, the U.S. EPA has strong incentive to
broaden the scope of liability whenever possible by including any
parties tangentially related to the site. 194
However, by allowing the U.S. EPA to include vendors of hazardous substances in the pool of defendants, courts subject an important segment of the economy to liability for acts over which
they possess no control, thus discouraging growth of small business
and providing strong disincentives for recycling waste. The only
congressional reference to manufacturers and vendors of hazardous substances in the CERCLA occurs in the tax provisions of the
Act. This single reference suggests that Congress intended this tax,
and not section 107 liability, to be the manufacturers' and vendors'
proper CERCLA contribution. Due to the split in the courts on
the issue of manufacturer and vendor activity and due to the overall effect of this split on waste-management policy, Congress
should address this liability issue when discussing CERCLA this
year.
189. Id. § 6901(c)(1).
190. Id. § 6902(a).
191. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
192. Although by 1987, over 26,000 hazardous waste sites had been identified, the
General Accounting Office estimated that the figure could rise to 368,000 sites with a
more comprehensive inventory. Paul Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre, 73 A.B.A. J. 66 (Nov.
1987).
193.

See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND

DESKBOOK 369, 375

(1986) (setting forth a U.S. EPA memorandum on interim CERCLA settlement policy,
dated Dec. 5, 1985, that states: "The goal of the agency is to bring enforcement action
wherever needed to assure private party cleanup or to recover costs.").
194. Economic analysis suggests that administrative agencies instinctively attempt to
shift costs to others to avoid depleting their budgets, thereby strengthening their posture
with Congress at budget making time. See PAUL H. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE
COMMON LAw-THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES 118-19 (1983).
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Congressional testimony at the time of CERCLA's passage indicates that gaps in the interpretation of CERCLA were expected to
be filled by the application of common law principles. 195 Because
Congress characterized the storage and handling of hazardous substances as an abnormally dangerous activity, it presumably intended that courts recognize common law defenses to strict
liability, especially when dealing with a class of parties not expressly named in the Act itself.196 As explained below, the most
appropriate defense by a vendor faced with a CERCLA claim is
assumption of the risk.
Assumption of the risk, when applicable, is a complete defense
to strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.1 97 For the
defense to be applicable, the assumption must be voluntary 98 and
the party assuming the risk must understand both the nature of the
risk and the foreseeable consequences.' 99 Although some transactions are excluded from the defense, 2 1 a normal sale to a knowledgeable buyer seems to be within the Restatement (Second) of
Torts definition.2 ° '
For these reasons, assumption of the risk should be available as a
defense for vendors of hazardous substances under CERCLA. A
facility operator who seeks a product for a useful purpose and
seeks the product for the very properties that make it hazardous,
voluntarily and knowingly assumes the risk of foreseeable harm.2 °2
Knowledge of the risks involved in the purchase of hazardous
substances may be established in several ways. First, knowledge
195.
196.
(1988).

197.

See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
Parties are limited to the statutorily defined defenses. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 523 (1977) ("The plaintiff's assumption

of the risk of harm from an abnormally dangerous activity bars his recovery for the

harm.").
198.

Id. § 496A.

199. Id. § 496D.
200. An example of this is the use of a common carrier or other public utility. Id.
§ 523 cmt. g.
201. This is true since the buyer has voluntarily entered into a relationship involving
a known risk. Comment c, illustration 2, to § 496(A) provides that a plaintiff who has
"entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the
risk.., is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances." Id. § 496(A), cmt. c, illus. 2; see also United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-90 (S.D. Iowa 1988) (finding the
-. : i,,
uicfui in defining the responsible parties in a CERCLA action as
well as providing "meaningful standards for resolving liability questions from the common law").
202. Seesupra text accompanying notes 178-82.
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may be established through examination of the nature of the transaction itself by inquiring into whether the buyer purchased material commonly known to be hazardous or toxic. Second, statutory
requirements regarding the sale of hazardous materials should create a presumption of knowing acceptance by the purchaser. For
example, regulations under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act 2°3 require that vendors of hazardous materials provide all cus-

tomers with a safety data sheet listing physical data, fire and explosion information, and toxicological properties. °4 Under existing
law, the supplier also must provide information about any toxic
chemicals contained in generically-named products.

20 5

When the

buyer is made aware of the toxic or hazardous nature of the products, voluntary and knowledgeable acceptance of the risk should be
presumed.2 °6
Applying this defense to the cases holding vendors liable would
2 "7 and Conservation
balance the equities. In A & F Materials
2
0
Chemical, the facility operators who purchased the spent caustic
products to neutralize waste assumed the risk of foreseeable releases. In General Electric,2° however, the defense should not
have been available to the vendor of PCB-contaminated oil because
it was the seller, not the buyer, who was aware of the hazardous
2 10
nature of the oil.

Allowing the assumption of risk defense would clarify the issue
of vendor liability by incorporating well-understood common law
doctrine into a statute intended to include common law principles. 21 1 However, absent clarification by Congress, an assumption

of the risk defense may not apply in CERCLA cases. While it may
provide a defense to contribution actions by purchasers, its applica203. 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1988).
204. Hazard Communication Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1991).
205. 40 C.F.R. § 372.45 (1991).
206. See supra note 201.
207. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984); see
supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
208. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
209. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
210. Id. at 297; see supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. The PCB-contaminated oil was purchased by dragstrip owners to keep dust down on the race track. Because it was not alleged that the buyers were aware of the existence of the hazardous
substance, voluntary acceptance of the risk of contamination was not shown. General
Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 295-96.
211. See supra notes 42- 44 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Aceto
Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-90 (S.D. Iowa 1988) (providing an example of the applicability of common law approaches to interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)
(1988)).
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tion when the government sues a vendor directly under section 107
is uncertain. Also, contradictory indemnification language in the
statute muddles the suggestion of common law defenses to
CERCLA liability.21 2
There is also confusion regarding application of the strict liability standard. In A & F Materials, 3 the court appeared to expand
the doctrine of strict liability by using it to spread liability to additional defendants.2" 4 Under these circumstances, and with an
emerging conflict regarding supplier liability within the Circuits,
clarification by Congress is needed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A conflict exists regarding whether vendors of hazardous materials may be held liable as "otherwise arranging for disposal" under
CERCLA. Although most of the transactions held to trigger liability involved the resale of used materials, some courts have refused to exclude even vendors of virgin raw materials from
liability.
The traditional common law doctrine of assumption of the risk
may provide a defense to liability, but conflicting language in
CERCLA raises questions regarding its application. The application of CERCLA strict liability to vendors provides a strong disincentive for recycling and reuse, discourages trade with smaller
companies, and places strong burdens on parties having little or no
control over the method of disposal of hazardous substances.
CERCLA is up for reauthorization this year, and the issue of
212.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) states:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance
shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator... or from any person
who may be liable . .. to any other person the liability imposed under this
section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of
this subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any
other person subject to liability under this section ... has or would have, by
reason of subrogation or otherwise against any person.
Id. § 9607(e).
This section does not readily resolve the question of whether an assumption of the risk
defense is statutorily barred nor does it clarify whether vendors are excluded from the
"may be liable" limitation.
213. United States v. A & F Materials, Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984); see
--.. *
supra notes 58-66 and scnnm,'-,-;.-..
Ian

214. A & F Materials, 582 F. Supp. at 844. The reasoning can be outlined as follows:
(A) defendant X sold the material to Y, (B) Y disposed of the material, (C) CERCLA
calls for strict liability, and (D) therefore, defendant X is liable for disposal.
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vendor liability clearly should be addressed with an eye toward its
effect on overall waste management policies.
CHRISTOPHER

J. GRANT

